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5 Questions: Philosophy of Logic 
Stephen Read 
1. Why were you initially drawn to the philosophy of logic? 
I was an undergraduate in both mathematics and philosophy at the University of 
Keele in the 1960s. We studied a little logic in both subjects, but there was barely 
any attempt to connect logic with philosophy—but one course in philosophy of 
mathematics with Alan Treherne sparked my interest in logic enough for me to go 
to the Mathematics department at the University of Bristol for an intensive 
Masters course in mathematical logic. My doctorate at Oxford was in philosophy 
of language, with connections to linguistics inspired by the Chomsky boom then 
raging even in Oxford. Identifying a subject of ‘philosophy of logic’ came slowly, 
needing to be carved out between philosophy of language and philosophy of 
mathematics. In particular, logic was very much directed towards its use in 
mathematics or the analysis of language. It was largely a dogmatic discipline, not 
welcoming any philosophical interference. The first books with the title 
Philosophy of Logic are those by Quine [12] in 1970 and Putnam [11] in 1972, 
but what really first led me into the subject were two publishing events of 1975, of 
Kripke’s ‘Outline of a theory of truth’ and of the first volume of Anderson and 
Belnap’s Entailment: the logic of relevance and necessity [2]. Both were a 
revelation, in overturning what seemed to be a dogma.  
The first dogma was that the logical paradoxes were really a dead subject. The 
story went that the set-theoretic paradoxes had caused a revolution in the 
foundations of mathematics around 1900, but were solved by the creation of 
axiomatic set theory by Zermelo and others; and the semantic paradoxes, 
distinguished from the other paradoxes by Ramsey, had been solved by Tarski 
by distinguishing object language from metalanguage. Kripke challenged this 
orthodoxy, revealing the hidden costs of implausibility of the Tarskian proposal. 
Kripke’s ideas opened up a whole research programme in developing his own 
account—which was indeed programmatic, as his use of ‘outline’ in his title 
emphasized—though I was never particularly attracted by his positive proposal, 
which famously retained the “ghost” of Tarski’s hierarchy. But it was revelatory in 
showing that what was the right response to the paradoxes was still a live issue.  
Discovering Anderson and Belnap’s work was even more instructive, not least in 
its immediate effect. I read their book while completing my doctoral thesis, and I 
was immediately weaned from philosophy of language to philosophy of logic and 
have never been back. What perhaps was most exciting was the thought that we 
could turn the tables on logic, so that instead of logic’s dictating what philosophy 
must think (e.g., that conditionals must be truth-functional), philosophy could 
examine logic’s presuppositions and find them wanting. At the same time, it 
seemed to me that Anderson and Belnap’s programme had problems of its own 
at its base, and that things I’d learned in logic at Bristol, particularly in proof 
theory, could be applied to the questions Anderson and Belnap had raised about 
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the correct account of logical consequence. Indeed, the focus on logical 
consequence, rather than logical truth, recorded a shift in view which, even 
though one can trace it back to Gentzen and Tarski, was only then becoming the 
norm.  
2. What are your main contributions to the philosophy of logic? 
At the same time as encountering these iconoclastic ideas in the philosophy of 
logic, I was also developing an interest in what is known as medieval logic. This 
is a bit of a misnomer, since it covers philosophy of logic and philosophy of 
language in the middle ages as much as, if not more than, logic itself. Since then, 
I have worked and thought and published in contemporary philosophy of logic 
and medieval logic about equally.  
My main contributions in contemporary ideas have been in relevant logic, in the 
theory of paradox, and in what is now termed ‘inferentialism’. The idea of relevant 
logic (sometimes known as ‘relevance logic’) is that in a valid consequence, the 
premises must be relevant to the conclusion. But it does not try to formalize that 
connection by a “relevance” filter. That would be a mistake, though one that is 
often made, especially by critics but even by some practitioners. Suppose that 
we said that an inference is valid if it is truth-preserving and the premises satisfy 
the “relevance” requirement of being relevant to the conclusion. Now take a truth-
preserving inference which does not satisfy the relevance test, and suppose the 
premises are true. Then since the argument is truth-preserving, it follows that the 
conclusion must be true. But since the premises fail the relevance test, we are 
apparently not supposed to infer the conclusion—it’s not a “relevantly valid” 
inference. That way lies madness. The main spur to my work in relevant logic 
was to find a better and more appropriate account of logical consequence which 
would reveal that really truth-preserving inferences were already relevant. This 
research culminated in my book Relevant Logic [14] (out of print but available 
online at http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~slr/Relevant_Logic.pdf), and my work 
since then has been guided by adherence to the belief that relevant logic gives 
the correct account of logical consequence.  
My work on paradox is more recent, and has been inspired by my research in 
medieval logic. My early work in medieval logic should probably be classed as 
philosophy of language, trying to make sense of the specifically medieval notion 
of supposition. A term “supposits” for an object or range of objects if it stands for 
those objects in a sentence, so the role of supposition as a technical term is 
similar to that of reference in modern semantics, though broader, for it also 
covers the logical behaviour of quantified and general terms. I’d been aware, at 
least since the publication of George Hughes’ translation of and commentary [8] 
on John Buridan’s chapter on “insolubles” in his Sophismata of the medievals’ 
treatment of the semantic paradoxes, but felt that Buridan’s analysis, though 
interesting as an alternative to Tarski’s and Kripke’s, was no more convincing 
than theirs. It slowly became apparent, however, that, although most scholarly 
work on the medieval account of paradoxes had focussed on Buridan, the most 
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seminal idea in medieval times was due to Thomas Bradwardine, writing some 
ten or twenty years earlier. It was with the publication of Bradwardine’s Insolubilia 
in the 1320s that the whole approach to the insolubles (which include the 
semantic paradoxes, but also epistemic paradoxes and other puzzles) underwent 
a sea change. Before Bradwardine’s attack on it, the dominant position was 
restrictionism, that the paradoxes resulted from an illicit form of self-reference. 
Bradwardine’s devastating criticism overturned this doctrine, and his positive 
idea, that the paradoxes are implicitly self-contradictory in somehow asserting 
their own truth as well as their falsehood, is found in some form or other in almost 
all succeeding treatments in the middle ages. I believe that Bradwardine’s idea is 
still viable, and have tried to develop it and apply it to a range of paradoxes in 
several recent publications, as well as editing and translating Bradwardine’s 
Insolubilia into English [4]. One might call it the “multiple-meanings” solution, 
since Bradwardine claims, indeed, proves, that the paradoxes signify or mean 
many things besides what they overtly say.  
A third area of philosophy of logic to which I’ve contributed is logical 
inferentialism, the idea that logical constants should be given a proof-theoretic 
rather than a model-theoretic semantics. I was introduced to the background to 
this idea in my studies with John Mayberry for my Masters thesis but it lay 
dormant until I was faced with the challenge of giving a relevant semantics for the 
connectives in my analysis of the foundations of relevant logic. A recurrent 
complaint in the 1960s about relevance logic was that it had no semantics. The 
same complaint had been directed at modal logic in the 1950s, famously 
answered by Kripke in his possible-worlds semantics. Meyer and Routley, among 
others, rose to this challenge by formulating the ternary semantics for relevant 
logic. Just as Kripke modelled the unary modal operators with a binary relation of 
relative possibility, so the binary entailment operator was modelled by a ternary 
relation, but, ternary relations being so much less intuitive than binary ones, this 
analysis was not the public relations success that Kripke’s work had managed for 
modal logic. Indeed, though model theory can yield significant technical results, it 
can only translate one meaning into another, or even distort it. My response was 
to propose giving the meaning of the relevant connectives proof-conditionally (in 
the final chapter of Relevant Logic [14]). The idea goes back ultimately to 
Gentzen, subsequently developed by Prawitz and Dummett. At its heart lies the 
proposal that meaning be given in the introduction-rules for a logical constant, 
which encapsulate its assertion-conditions, requiring that the elimination-rules 
should be justified by that meaning and so should lie in an appropriate relation of 
harmony with them. I’ve tried to spell this out in the notion of “general-elimination 
harmony” (a term coined by Nissim Francez and my colleague Roy Dyckhoff)—
see [13].  
3. What is the proper role of philosophy of logic in relation to other disciplines, 
and to other branches of philosophy? 
Where there are two distinct activities and two different names, it’s useful to use 
one name for the one, the other for the other, but unfortunately, there’s been no 
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consistent use of the terms ‘philosophy of logic’ and ‘philosophical logic’. I prefer 
to use the former for the philosophical discipline of examining logical notions, the 
latter for the development of logical concepts and methods for philosophical 
purposes (contrasted with mathematical logic): thus philosophical logic will 
embrace modal logic, substructural logic, many-valued logic, mereology, and so 
on, whereas mathematical logic has included set theory, recursion theory and 
suchlike. Of course, these are not hard and fast divisions and can overlap. 
Philosophy of logic, in contrast, is philosophy, like philosophy of science and 
philosophy of art, with its distinct subject matter. Its role is to examine the 
concepts of logic, including consequence, quantifiers, identity, proof, model and 
so on. It can clearly overlap with philosophy of language, when looking at 
concepts like name, predicate and proposition, or with metaphysics, in examining 
identity, part and whole. Sharp distinctions are not important, so much as 
polarities of focus.  
4. What have been the most significant advances in the philosophy of logic? 
The most significant advance in philosophy of logic in recent decades has been 
the recognition that logical consequence is the predominant notion, and one 
worthy of close examination both as to its foundations and to its identification. 
Although the study of consequence goes back at least to Gentzen, and arguably 
much earlier (Bolzano, the medievals, indeed, to Aristotle), and alternative 
accounts of consequence include the proposed revisions of the intuitionists (with 
the identification of a specifically intuitionist notion of consequence by Heyting in 
1930, though rejected by the founder of intuitionism, Brouwer, himself) and of the 
relevantists (stemming from Ackermann’s famous paper ‘Begründung einer 
strengen Implikation’ [1] of 1956), the thought that logic is identical with logical 
truth lingered well into the second half of the twentieth century. The steps from 
logical truth to the focus on the consequence relation between two formulae, then 
to that between a set of formulae and a formula, and finally to its (possibly) most 
general form in the relation between sets of formulae (usually dubbed “multiple-
conclusion” consequence) was slow and hard won. Even now the legitimacy of 
multiple-conclusion consequence is highly tendentious.  
The attitude to logical revision has also changed dramatically since Quine posed 
his “deviant’s dilemma” [12] in 1970: “when he tries to deny the doctrine he 
merely changes the subject.” Possibilities have opened up in at least two 
dimensions. The rearguard action tried to identify logic with so-called first-order 
classical logic, resisting extensions to higher-order logic and to modal and other 
intensional logics. These are now much more readily accepted as part of the 
proper study of logic, with important applications both in philosophy and in other 
disciplines, such as computer science. They are what Susan Haack [6] called 
“extended logics”; in addition there are what she called deviant logics, such as 
intuitionist and relevant, and also now dialetheic, non-contractive and other logics 
which seek not to extend first-order logic, but to overturn it. Clearly, the extended 
logics can live happily side by side; recent proposals for a logical pluralism try to 
suggest that deviant logics can also co-exist, identifying different consequence 
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relations as appropriate for different purposes, but all equally good and equally 
right. Whether this proposal is coherent seems to me to be a vital matter for 
future research.  
One of the main spurs to logical revision was the implicational paradoxes, but 
most recent grounds for logical revision (and logical pluralism) have been the 
logical paradoxes. As already mentioned, research into the semantic paradoxes 
was re-awakened by Kripke’s classic paper [10] of 1975. The paradoxes seem to 
force a choice between revising our theory of truth or our logic. Tarski chose to 
constrain the account of truth by imposing a hierarchy of truth-predicates. Kripke 
at first glance appears to do neither: he retains classical logic (albeit, allowing 
truth to be a partial predicate) and he rejects the hierarchy, seeking a universal 
notion of truth. In reality, both logic and truth are compromised. The “ghost” of the 
hierarchy means that several semantic concepts cannot be expressed (in the 
object language), e.g., ‘paradoxical’, and even the truth predicate seems 
artificially constrained. Moreover, as subsequently interpreted, the classical logic 
of Tarski has been replaced by a three-valued logic, or a super-valuational logic 
whose consequence relation is non-standard.  
These limitations have led to new avenues of research in recent years, and 
opened the possibility of further logical revision in light of the paradoxes. Even if 
there is less consensus about the right approach to the paradoxes, there is now 
a lively debate. Much of this has focussed on recognition of the importance of 
Curry’s paradox, though its full force, and its distinctness from the Liar paradox, 
is not always appreciated. Curry’s aim in [5] was to investigate how the problems 
with Russell’s paradox (of the set of all sets which are not members of 
themselves) might be replicated in a logic without negation. Take an arbitrary 
sentence A, and consider the set of all sets such that if they are self-membered 
then A. A semantic version of the paradox was identified subsequently: by 
diagonalization, there is a sentence C equivalent (or even identical) to ‘If C is true 
then A’. An argument turning on the truth-equivalence, modus ponens, 
contraction (or absorption) and conditional proof establishes A, whatever A was. 
If A is ⊥, the absurd sentence, then C is effectively the Liar (since not-B is 
equivalent to ‘if B then ⊥’); more interestingly, the argument derives triviality 
(arbitrary A) directly without a detour through a contradiction and the spread law 
(if A and not-A then B), so rejecting the spread law and possibly accepting true 
contradictions does not suffice to avoid triviality. Either some other logical 
principles must go (e.g., contraction) or (as I myself favour) the truth-equivalence 
must be qualified.  
In medieval (philosophy of) logic, the most significant advance in recent years 
has been a better understanding of the medieval logical genre of obligations. 
There are many extant treatises on obligations, from around 1200 right through 
to the late middle ages, but scholars were very puzzled by them for many years. 
They are theoretical treatises giving different versions of rules for a curious form 
of disputation, though no records of any actual such disputations exist. In an 
obligational disputation, the Opponent presents a casus (a hypothetical situation) 
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and a proposition, usually false in that situation; if the Respondent agrees to take 
part, the Opponent fires a series of further propositions at the Respondent, which 
the Respondent may only grant, deny or doubt, according to a strict set of rules, 
and depending on the initial proposition and the casus. What, however, was the 
point of such disputations, and why were the rules constructed as they were? 
There is still disagreement on the first question, but the second has yielded to 
detailed research, revealing essentially just two (or perhaps three) main types of 
theory, the standard theory (responsio antiqua—the old response) and a rival 
theory (responsio nova—the new response) formulated by reason of 
dissatisfaction with certain aspects of the standard theory. The old response had 
a dynamic nature, which led in some cases to changes of response in the course 
of a disputation. This seems to have unsettled some theorists, and the new 
response speaks to this issue, but at the cost of robbing the theory of some of its 
more exciting aspects. Sense has emerged out of darkness, but there is much 
more research needed.  
5. What are the most important open problems in philosophy of logic, and what 
are the prospects for progress? 
The times seem right for a thousand flowers to bloom, for the eclecticism of 
logical pluralism, if sense can be made of the idea of multiple equally good 
consequence relations. The main challenge is to avoid pluralism about 
consequence collapsing into pluralism, or even relativism, about truth. (Of 
course, if truth is relative, then so too is truth-preservation, and then 
consequence is also relative.) Beall and Restall [3] proposed to take the model-
theoretic formulae for truth-preservation, that a valid consequence preserves 
truth in a model, and replace ‘model’ by ‘case’ or ‘situation’ as a way of capturing 
the necessity and formality of consequence. But does this relativize truth to ‘truth 
in a case’; and if we now restrict cases to, e.g., consistent cases, or complete 
cases, or generalize it to inconsistent and incomplete cases, is there any 
justification for denying that consequence is truth-preservation in all cases, rather 
than just those which support classical logic, or intuitionistic logic or any but the 
weakest logic validated by the largest class of models?  
Inferentialism has its own pluralists, often advocating a wide class of 
substructural logics as equally good. But Quine’s challenge is ever present: if 
meaning is given by the logical rules, do not different rules (different logics) 
necessarily entail different meanings? One response is to separate the 
operational rules (as meaning-determining for the connectives) from the 
structural rules (as defining the underlying logic). There is much work to be done 
here, first, to produce a viable inferentialist account of logical consequence 
(monistic or pluralist); secondly, to show its superiority to the model-theoretic 
account (as well as showing the inadequacy of the latter).  
Kripke’s arguments in ‘Naming and necessity’ [9] produced a revolution across 
philosophy in showing that the concepts of analyticity, necessity and apriority 
were not obviously, indeed, perhaps not in fact, co-extensive. (His observation 
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was not unprecedented—see, e.g., Sloman’s paper [15] in Analysis 1967—but it 
was his that were effective). One upshot has been to recognise sentences such 
as ‘I am here now’ as logically true, and context-sensitive expressions as 
requiring logical treatment. But a viable context-sensitive account of logical 
consequence is still wanting. The creation of two-dimensional semantics, 
separating the context of assessment from the context of utterance, was crucial, 
but the proper articulation has yet to be accepted into the mainstream.  
There has been much technical work on truth theories inspired by Kripke’s 
suggestions for dealing with paradox. The verdict is still open, however, on 
whether logic should be revised in light of the paradoxes, indeed, whether logic 
should be revised for other than strictly logical reasons, or whether the revisions 
should be in the account of truth, leaving logic intact. Are there really true 
contradictions, can or should they be saved from triviality, or do the paradoxes 
turn on insensitivity to contextual factors or blindness to the multiple meanings of 
expressions? There are many many questions to pursue. The only doubt is 
whether it will be possible to recognise the correct conclusions among the 
plethora of proposals.  
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